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CLS STANDS FOR CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES,
IF ANYONE REMEMBERS
E. Dana Neacsu*
INTRODUCTION
Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"), which started as a Left
movement within legal academia,2 has undergone so many
* Attorney, New York City; former Assistant Corporate Counsel, New York
City Law Department; Judge, Cimpulung, Romania; Assistant Professor of Law,
Facultatea de Drept, Bucharest. Facultatea de Drept, Diploma de Drept, 1989;
Faculte de Droit et des Etudes Politiques, Caen, France, D.E.A. 1991; Harvard
Law School, LL.M., 1994. The author thanks her hubby, Professor Mickey Davis
and her step daughter, Abby, for their assistance, endurance, and love; she also
thanks her editor at the Journal, Alexander Kaplan, for his professionalism in the
face of occasional disagreement.
For a guide to CLS see generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1987); David L. Gregory, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by
Mark Kelman, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1138 (1987) (book review). See also Jonathan
Turley, Roberto Unger's Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory:
Introduction: The Hitchhiker's Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81 Nw.
U. L. REV. 593, 594 (1987) ("At its most basic level, the CLS movement
challenges society to consider some ultimate questions about the validity of its
own institutions and to reconsider some past 'ultimate answers' upon which those
institutions are based."); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429
(1987). For a comprehensive bibliography of CLS's works, see Duncan Kennedy
and Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461
(1984). See also ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL
CRITIQUE (1990); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133
(1991) (reviewing ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITcAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL
CRmQUE (1990).
2 See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 561, 561 n.1, 564 (1983) (describing the two main tendencies in the
CLS movement, defining Kennedy as belonging to the first non-Marxist one and
placing CLS "within the tradition of leftist tendencies in modem legal thought
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changes, that one may liken it to products of pop culture, such as
the television cartoon show, South Park.3 South Park features a
character named Kenny, totally unlike any other cartoon hero,
tragic or otherwise. Like Kenny, who is an outsider and who
speaks a language unintelligible to all except, astonishingly, his
classmates, CLS no longer seems to possess a voice comprehensi-
ble to anyone outside its own small circle. Kenny, unlike all other
cartoon figures, dies in every episode.4 Significantly, often
Kenny's death has been self-inflicted-though not necessarily
intentional-when, for instance, he ignores warnings of imminent
danger. Like Kenny, CLS has suffered many often self-inflicted
injuries. Like South Park, generally, CLS is certainly colorful, but
often little more than that and, as in the cartoon, except for the
certainty of Kenny's death and later resurrection, there seems more
flash than substance in its existence. We are left to guess whether
CLS will prove to be as resilient after apparent death, as Kenny.
It is this author's hope, however, that just as Kenny found his
post-mortem voice and purpose in South Park: Bigger, Longer, &
Uncut,5 CLS also might rediscover its own. To do so may well
and practice"). There are commentators who prefer "political location" instead
of "intellectual movement." See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political
History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1528 n.53 (1991) (also describing CLS as
postmodernist rather than leftist). See also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SIECLE) 9 (1997) [hereinafter, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICA-
TION] ("CLS has existed... in four quite distinct modes. First, there was once
a 'movement' called cls; there still exists a cls 'school' and a 'theory of law'
called cls; and there is from time to time a media 'factoid' called cls").
3 South Park is a half-hour television cartoon show that airs on the Comedy
Central network, channel 45 in New York City. In 1999, the cartoon was turned
into a movie. SOUTH PARK: BIGGER, LONGER, & UNCUT (Paramount Pictures
1999). See Stuart Klawans, Bewitched. Summer Celluloid Meltdown, NATION,
Sept. 6, 1999, at 36 (providing a short and comprehensive review of the movie).
4 Kenny's many deaths is the show's running gag. The climax of every
episode, in fact, arrives when one of his friends cries out, "The Bastards! They
killed Kenny!" with more certain though strangely comic predictability than the
Road Runner going over the inevitable cliff.
' In the South Park movie version, Kenny found his ultimately comprehensi-
ble voice under the extremely difficult circumstances of his death (of course, in
the milieu of the South Park story line, this was as certain-and undisturb-
ing-as the sunset following the sunrise).
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require some new-actually, of course, old-critical theories of
law, such as those that view legal systems as a product of the
societies they purport to govern,6 and that those theories will not
be rejected ab initio as before. Duncan Kennedy's7 work shows,
though it eventually rejected the notion of law as pure superstruc-
ture, that CLS had understood early on the relation, in general,
between economic base and legal systems and, in particular, that
between social structures and distribution of rights.8 In many ways,
Duncan Kennedy's infamous 1983 "little red book," Legal
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against
6 Karl Marx, Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,
in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 1, 4 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
7 Professor of law at Harvard Law School, Kennedy was one of the founders
of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. Kennedy's, How the Law School
Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REv. L. & Soc. ACTION 71 (1970) may have marked
the pre-beginning of the movement. See Gordon A. Christenson, Special Event.
Celebrating a Centennial: A Proud Past, A Promising Future: Looking Back "In
Pursuit of the Art of Law," 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1015, 1920 n.16 (1996).
8 Compare Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (asserting that "the 'freedom' of
individualism is negative, alienated, and arbitrary. . . . We can achieve real
freedom only collectively, through group self-determination," which "implies the
use of force against the individual.") with DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING,
ETC. (1993) [hereinafter SEXY DRESSING] (continuing to discuss the economics
of human relations, e.g., those implied in erotic heterosexual abuse) or with
KENNEDY, A CRMQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 2 (strictly focusing on a
postmodernist critique of judicial decision making). See also J. Paul Oetken,
Note, Form and Substance in Critical Legal Studies, 100 YALE L.J. 2209, 2209-
10 (1991) (discussing Kennedy's influence on CLS). See also Donald Galloway,
Nothing if Not Critical: A Review of A Critique of Adjudication (fin de siecle)
by Duncan Kennedy, 35 ALBERTA L. REv. 273, 273 (1997) (book review):
In many respects, Duncan Kennedy is the Holden Caulfield of the legal
academy... .Like J.D. Salinger's protagonist, Kennedy reveals a deep
alienation and loss of faith in social institutions which translates into
an antipathy towards 'phonies,' [and] expresses disdain, if not
contempt, for the denials, duplicity and bad faith that he finds when he
examines the rhetoric and actions of those who have assumed
traditional roles in the social institutions with which he is most
familiar-in particular, appellate judges, legal educators, lawyers and
legal philosophers.
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the System, 9 captured the essence of CLS and appears to have
contained the seeds of its future. This is why it, and its inspiring
author, serve as a reference point for much of this Article. The
Polemic encouraged the legal community to "[r]esist!" and to avoid
or at least to postpone becoming innocent ideological instru-
ments' ° employed and exploited for the illegitimate reproduction
of hierarchy." At more or less the same time, Kennedy offered
this work in a considerably altered shape, smaller size, and under
a different title, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy,12
being but a chapter in a larger work and whose polemical content
and theory of distribution of rights is startling for its complete
absence. It is importantly, however, the version still in print. If the
1983 pamphlet version contained Marxist observations, only to
reject its methods, 13 the shortened14 Chapter Edition eschews any
reference to its Marxist counterpart, 15 thus capturing in its own
evolution the development of the larger CLS movement of which
it is a signal part.16 Nevertheless, no doubt due to the stylistic
9 DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983) [hereinafter POLEMIC].
10 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at ii.
1I KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 36.
12 Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54, (David Kairys ed. 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Legal
Education as Training for Hierarchy or "Chapter Edition"].
13 See generally JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, SEARCH FOR A METHOD (1963) (Hazel
E. Barnes trans.) (analyzing such a method); Jason E. Whitehead, From Criticism
to Critique: Preserving the Radical Potential of Critical Legal Studies through
a Reexamination of Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
701, 721-31 (1999).
14 Kennedy implies that the two works, except for their different sizes, are
the same, noting at the end of the Chapter Edition that the pamphlet rendition is
simply its "enlarged" counterpart. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for
Hierarchy, supra note 12, at 75.
1" Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, supra note 12, at
54.
16 The peak of CLS scholarship seems to be 1982-83. See, e.g., THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1st ed. 1982)
(perceived at that time as CLS's "manifesto," the book opened with Kairys'
virulent attack on law as a tool for maintaining the social status quo and
contained writings by the most prominent CLS proponents, such as Elizabeth
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force and charm of the author's personality and background, even
the Chapter Edition still seems radical and purposeful while
inflated with what is now, at the turn of the century, an all-too-
familiar quasi-generalized leftist emptiness.
As what appears to be the prime example of the crits' 17
struggle with their Marxist roots, this Article focuses on Duncan
Kennedy's infamous Polemic, which manifests both the climax and
the downfall of CLS. Kennedy has an extraordinary sense of social
injustice which, unfortunately he does not employ to seek
solutions. His refusal, for example, to adopt a clear and unique
position as observed by Peter Gabel 8 may have sent a message
of weakness to followers who decided, in response, to separate and
focus on concrete action, rather than on a definably indeterminate
indeterminism.
Thus, this Article is an excursion through CLS from its start as
an exhilarating legal movement, a product of the post-Vietnam War
era, and the counterpart of the European leftist renaissance that
sprang Venus-like from DeGaulle's resignation, through the
Mensch, Duncan Kennedy, and Morton Horwitz). As the introduction to the third
edition states, "[t]his book, in all three editions, is an attempt to develop a
progressive, critical analysis of current trends, decisions, and legal reasoning and
of the operation and social role of the law in contemporary American society."
DAVID KAIRYs, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRrTQUE 16 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). See also William E. Forbath,
Taking Lefts Seriously, 92 YALE L.J. 1041 (1983) (reviewing THE POLITICS OF
LAW, 1st ed., supra); Sanford Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said than
Done, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466 (1983) (reviewing THE POLITICS OF LAW, 1st ed.,
supra); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 561-63 (1983), reprinted in ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986) (summarizing the movement's mission of
undermining "the central ideas of modem legal thought," objectivism and
formalism and stating that law is "the expression of a particular vision of
society"). See also Joseph Isenbergh, Why Law?, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1117 (1987)
(reviewing ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(1986)).
17 The label "crits" is applied commonly to CLS scholars. See Gary Minda,
The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 615 (1989).
18 See generally Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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deplorable splintering of CLS which caused fem-crits and race
crits 19 to more or less renounce the movement, to its present
center-Left stance from which it simultaneously embraces and
distances itself from Marxism. The salvation for CLS can only be
achieved by abandoning its almost cartoon-like popular hype in
favor of an authentic leftism. Karl Marx, whether "vulgar"'2 in his
explicit economic concepts or not, was, as Herbert Marcuse
noted,2" a brilliant scholar. Despite the crits' constant efforts to
distance themselves from Marxism and its social criticism, the
extent to which CLS remains a legitimate legal movement is
because it embraced an essentially Marxist criticism of illegitimate
social power.22
This Article suggests first, that because CLS was so obsessed
with rejecting liberalism's claim to objective analysis, it lamentably
'9 Gary Minda, Neil Gotanda and the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 4
ASIAN L.J. 7, 15 (1997) ("Subgroups splintering off from CLS emerged, the most
important being the Fem-Crits and the Critical Race Scholars.").
[While the Fem-Crits keep] reminding us about the central importance
of gender in framing our analysis of law[,] African-Americans, in turn,
brought to the surface the importance of race consciousness in framing
how the law dealt with race issues. The affinity between CLS and the
legal feminist and critical race theory movements arose from the fact
that these movements shared an 'outsider status' defined by the
personal observation on what it was like to be 'outsider.'
Id. at 9.
20 See Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, ALSA F.,
Winter 1982 (1982) [hereinafter Gramsci and the Legal System] (applying
Gramsci's theory to legal studies and embracing with apparent relief a "Marxist"
Gramsci who rejected the "vulgar" dichotomy of base and superstructure).
Briefly, the base or basis describes the mode of production in a certain type of
society, e.g, feudalism, and, as such, determines the superstructure, which
functions as the legitimizing ideology that, of course, includes religion,
institutions, the State, law, and art. See Marx, supra note 6, at 5.
21 HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1966).
22 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1518 n.16 (assessing that CLS, as a political
place, offers a "common opposition to a system of illegitimate hierarchy"). For
a summary of Marxist criticism of illegitimate social power, see KARL MARX,
THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848). See also Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 150
(William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (addressing the illegitimate interventions
of social power).
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minimized and even trivialized conservative theories and their
perpetuation of the status quo. Second, this misplaced preoccupa-
tion caused CLS to lose its adherents, strength and legacy.
Ultimately, this Article argues that acknowledging the missed
opportunities and openly embracing its Marxist roots may be CLS'
only chance to overcome its present crisis.
I. CLS: FROM FOUNDATION TO CURRENT CRISIS
A. CLS at the Beginning
Despite the enormous social transformations of the 1960s, the
dominant theory of law remained unchanged, and, with what must
have been increasing difficulty, continued to present law as neutral
and above, or at least autonomous of, politics. 23 CLS was born
out of frustration with, and in an effort to expose, the contradic-
tions and incoherence of both liberal and conservative legal
theories.24 According to what is surely CLS's original claim, the
23 See Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-and Its
Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 257 (1981) (criticizing the legal theories of the
1950s for de-emphasizing the politicization of law); Gary Peller, Neutral
Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 569 (1988) (criticizing
modem legal theories for picturing law as neutral and for their insistence that
institutions could settle matters about the inconsistencies of law and politics);
Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1529-30.
24 Some commentators stated that "critical legal studies is grounded in part
in legal realism," explaining the spring of "well defined pro-active jurisprudence
in critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and critical race theory" as caused
in part by Rawls' theory of justice, and his invention of the "veil of ignorance,"
which shows the law as a product of power. Gerald P. Moran, A Radical Theory
of Jurisprudence: The "Decisionmaker" as the Source of Law-The Ohio
Supreme Court's Adoption of the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine as a Model, 30
AKRON L. REV. 393, 412 & n.69 (1997) (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971)). Other commentators stated that CLS "arose, at least in part, as
an attack" on the Chicago school of law and economics. See, e.g., Daniel T.
Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions
of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 193, 194 (1998). See also MARK
KELMAN, supra note 1, at 114 (1987) ("Since a fair number of CLS writers
attacked Law and Economics writing, either in detail or in passing, CLS was
often viewed by outsiders unfamiliar with the range of CLS as predominantly an
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discourses of both conservative and liberal theories concealed and
legitimized unacceptable hierarchies of "social power."'  Thus,
originally, CLS offered a philosophical structure to those who
sought a critical position of the social (legal) system in order to
rectify social injustice.26 The critical thrust of CLS was that "legal
scholarship can be a kind of transformative political action, ' 27 and
thus CLS, its literature, and its conferences, initially focused on
action and social change.28 To its merit, then, CLS's critical
position has never been an end in itself but, instead, as a style of
legal discourse focused on the organization of American society.
anti-Law and Economics group."). For a description of the "literal" beginning of
CLS see Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1525.
2 Alan Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OxFORD J. L. STUDIES
1, 4-7 (1986) (stating that CLS' criticism of legal liberalism was caused by the
apparent rationality of the latter's discourse, which concealed social power). See
also James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local
Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 688 (1985) (claiming that critical legal
scholarship theories "share at least a certain assumption about the politics of
reason: the social power of apparently rational discourse"). The force and focus
of the earliest CLS pieces almost uniformly highlighted this claim. See, e.g.,
Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 370-
75 (1982-1983). For a more recent analysis of this issue see Rob Atkinson,
Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853, 909-66 (1992).
26 CLS addressed not mere injustice, nor legal injustice, nor a technical
variety of that, like a misconstrued search for the Framer's "original intention,"
but social injustice in its large and popular, as well as popularly-understood form,
such as that which Sheila, the student protester, sings about in the ballad, "Easy
to be Hard" in the musical, Hair. GALT MACDERMOT, Easy to Be Hard, in HAIR
(1968).
27 David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 591 (1984).
28 Albert P. Cardarelli & Stephen C. Hicks, Criminologyradicalism in Law
and Criminology: A Retrospective View of Critical Legal Studies and Radical
Criminology, 84 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 502, 516-17 (1993) (stating that
CLS' mission was to attack "formalism" and "objectivism" in legal education
and to show its shallowness regarding politics and ideology); ROBERTO M.
UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESS1TARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE
SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 371 (1987) (arguing that law is one of the
basic "structures" used by a faction to hold the majority "hostage to [that]
faction").
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On the other hand, CLS often seemed to confuse the two,
attacking legal "formalism"29 and "objectivism ' '30 all the while
encouraging the instrumental use of legal practice and legal
doctrine to advance leftist aims.3' By placing a belief in indeter-
minacy squarely at the center of judicial rhetoric, 32 CLS chal-
lenged the importance of the vindication of rights, especially
constitutional rights.33 CLS emphasized "the legal system's
deviations from rules" and from that concluded, quite correctly,
29 Unger, supra note 2, at 564 ("What I mean by formalism in this context
is a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility of, a method of
legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes about the
basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or
visionary.").
30 Unger, supra note 2, at 565 ("By objectivism I mean the belief that the
authoritative legal materials-the system of statutes, cases, and accepted legal
ideas-embody and sustain a defensible scheme of human association.").
3' Trubek, supra note 27, at 591-94.
32 About the indeterminacy thesis-the ambiguity of law due to the inherent
ambiguity of language-and the ideology thesis, see Boyle, supra note 25, at
685; Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276 (1984); Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and
Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1766-76 (1976)
[hereinafter Form and Substance]; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 211-19, 354-60 (1979)
[hereinafter Blackstone's Commentaries]; Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the
Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 683 (1985);
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 810-18 (1983); Whitehead, supra
note 13, 705-21; Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
3' Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82
CALIF. L. REv. 893, 903 (1994) ("Despite some sympathy with Critical Legal
Studies, [Critical Race Theory] scholars rejected the CLS 'rights critique'
because it ignored the importance of legal rights to racial minorities."); Tushnet,
supra note 2, at 1520 (stating that "some feminist and minority scholars who
share the cls political location have disagreed with some formulations of the
indeterminacy thesis, and in particular with the use of that thesis to challenge the
importance of the vindication of rights, especially constitutional rights").
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that this "demonstrates a crisis of liberalism. ' 34 As a result,
perhaps, CLS focused too much on language35 and too little on substance.36
34 James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-
Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 775 n.6 (1995) (citing
Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 32; Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973)).
3' For examples of CLS rhetoric, see Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Mod-
ern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 298 (1985);
Michael H. Davis, Critical Jurisprudence: An Essay on the Legal Theory of
Robert Burt's Taking Care of Strangers, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 419, 423 (stating
that legal concepts "focus attention on a very few and arguably irrelevant
artificial details"); David Fraser & Alan Freeman, What's Hockey Got to Do
With it, Anyway? Comparative Canadian-American Perspectives on Constitution-
al Law and Rights, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 259 (1987); Alan D. Freeman & John
H. Schlegel, Sex, Power and Silliness: An Essay on Ackerman's Reconstructing
American Law, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 847, 848 (1985); Gabel & Kennedy, supra
note 18, 1; Allan C. Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire (Book
Review), 96 YALE L.J. 637, 637 (1987); Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J.
Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama
of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 245 (1984); Allan C.
Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
850, 859-60, 886 n.225 (1985); Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293,
322 (1984); David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1377, 1385 (1985);
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275,
1282 (1981); William Nelson, An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies Between
Robert W. Gordon and William Nelson, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 139 (1988); Mark
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1037 (1980); Tushnet, The Dialectics
of Legal History, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1305 (1979) (Book Review); Tushnet,
An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1369 n.18 (1984).
36 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive
Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 690 (1998) ("The lack of coherent political
objectives in the CLS program induced many groups such as feminists and
critical race theorists to spin off with their own particularist programs for social
justice."). For a different opinion see MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) (claiming the crits' most substantial
achievement was their expos6 of legal formalism as a disguise for the political
and distributive functions of law); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories,
36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) (stating that CLS uses history to criticize the social
status quo); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3
REs. IN L. & Soc. 3 (1980) (surveying American legal thought and arguing that
it should expose the social power structure).
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At the same time, however, there were CLS adherents and
scholars who kept their focus on social change as a means of
achieving social justice.37 Roberto Unger, perhaps the leading
voice for societal transformation in the critical school, attempted to
"transform legal doctrine into one more arena for continuing the
fight over the right and possible forms of social life."38 He viewed
that transformation as taking place through an "internal develop-
ment," in which the ideal conflicts of law are exploited to trans-
form the actual law bit by bit, first changing the law, then revising
ideal conceptions in light of that change, and then working for
more change.39 Overall, with all its self-imposed limits, CLS
ended up having a measurable impact on legal education' or at
least on post-modern schools of jurisprudence." In the process,
" According to Roberto Unger:
Two main tendencies can be distinguished in the critical legal studies
movement. One tendency sees past or contemporary doctrine as the
expression of a particular vision of society while emphasizing the
contradictory and manipulable character of doctrinal argument. Its
immediate antecedents lie in antiformalist legal theories and structural-
ist approaches to cultural history.
Unger, supra note 2, at 561 n.1 (citing Kennedy, Blackstone's Commentaries,
supra note 32; Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981)).
Another tendency grows out of the social theories of Marx and Weber
and the mode of social and historical analysis that combines functional-
ist methods with radical aims. Its point of departure has been the thesis
that law and legal doctrine reflect, confirm, and reshape the social
divisions and hierarchies inherent in a type or stage of social organiza-
tion such as capitalism.
Unger, supra note 2, at 561 n.1 (citing Horwitz, supra note 36; David M.
Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the
Challenge of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 527
(1977).
38 Unger, supra note 2, at 579.
39 Unger, supra note 2, at 580; see also Eric A. Bilsky, Metaphysical and
Ethical Skepticism in Legal Theory, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 187 (1997).
4 For example, David Kairys underscores that CLS was critical in exposing
the indeterminate nature of law. KAIRYS, supra note 16, at 4.
41 At least some commentators agree that CLS is a part of postmodem
jurisprudence. See Ostas, supra note 24, at 208.
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however, it gave birth to division instead of unity among its
cadre,42 rendering it impossible to act as the phalanx of anything
but its own internal disputes. Therefore, while CLS could never
have been the cosmetic nihilism suggested by one of its best
known critics, Dean Carrington of Duke University,43 it has not
produced many meaningful results either. Perhaps, its apparently
debilitating crisis of identity was caused by the unrelentingly
hostile criticism it weathered both from outside and inside its own
ranks.
Whatever the cause, it seems that CLS has stopped short of
answering its own questions about the law's lack of neutrality or
about its failure to function with any kind of reason or logic. David
Kairys has observed this general preference for "debating other
issues" instead of answering the above questions or even of
acknowledging the fact that law functions to legitimate existing
social and power relations."
42 For example, critical race theorists became a "newly-organized splinter
group" separating from CLS because their core belief was that "race was the real
cause of disadvantage in society, and [not the] critical legal studies movement['s]
debunking of liberalism." Jeffrey J. Pyle, Race, Equality and the Rule of Law:
Critical Race Theory's Attack on the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C. L. REv.
787, 799 (1999). Also, "[m]any early feminist legal critiques grew out of,
paralleled, or overlapped the interventions of [CLS]." Banu Ramachandran, Re-
Reading Difference: Feminist Critiques of the Law School Classroom and the
Problem with Speaking from Experience, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1765 (1998).
" Dean Carrington has argued that CLS, like other schools of thought based
on what he sees as "nihilism," is irrelevant to the proper mission of law schools.
See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227
(1984) (stating that "professionalism and intellectual courage of lawyers ...
cannot abide ... the embrace of nihilism and its lesson that who decides is
everything, and principle nothing but cosmetic").
44KAIRYS, supra note 40, at 6. Kairys explained that shift in the debate by
noting that:
If law is not determinate or neutral or a function of reason and logic
rather than values and politics, government by law reduces to
government by lawyers, and there is little justification for the broad-
scale displacement of democracy. The extraordinary role of law in our
society and culture is hard to justify once the idealized model is
recognized as mythic.
KAIRYS, supra note 40, at 6.
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B. CLS and Its Self-imposed Crisis
The present crisis that CLS faces may be the logical result of
CLS's limited focus on liberalism as a false ideology, instead of on
conservatism, and its apparent shift of focus toward more modest
goals, such as legal education in itself. In the mid 1980s, even a
non-crit (to put it mildly), Clark Byse, was able to credit CLS with
influencing legal education.45 Despite its "eclectic character,"
Byse recognized the cohesion CLS achieved through its disenchant-
ment with liberal legalism.' By the end of the century, however,
it seems that, as G. Edward White had predicted fifteen years
earlier, "liberalism will [have] absorb[ed] and convert[ed] Critical
theory ... [and in the end] very little will have changed . . .let
alone have been transformed. 47
CLS was born as an effort, however modest, to provide the
future legal elite with the tools necessary for social change. 48 The
choice, apparently, seemed to be between a radical critique-and
what could this mean but something which, at least in its inspira-
tion, shared the Marxist class analysis--or a critique involving
"baby steps,"49 which could allow continued membership in the
45 Clark Byce, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1081
(1986).
46 id.
47 G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 649, 672 (1984).
48 See, e.g., Trubek, supra note 27, at 591 (explaining that, [w]hile Critical
legal scholars seek to show relationships between the world views embedded in
modem legal consciousness and domination in capitalist society, they also want
to change that consciousness and those relationships"); Guyora Binder, Beyond
Criticism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 888, 888-89 (1988) (addressing criticism of CLS
as not sufficiently engaged and explaining that CLS scholars outlined "a theory
of social change compatible with [their intellectual] commitments and a strategy
for pursuing social change that could not only structure the political activity of
[CLS] scholars, but could also provide a productive focus for their future
teaching and research").
49 "Baby Steps" was the title of Dr. Leo Marvin's glib pop psychology text
that he tried to sell to his patient in WHAT ABOUT BOB? (Touchstone Pictures
1991). Kennedy tried to provide a pop version of "Marxism" via the same kind
of "baby steps" that Dr. Marvin enlisted to provide a kind of pop version of
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legal order, including the education of future lawyers, while at the
same time afford the satisfaction of exposing the false claims of
liberalism.
But, in large part, the issue of choosing between old Marxist
theories and new post-modem ones acted as a substitute for
focussing on the roles of legal philosophy and law in perpetuating
the social system, a focus that had previously preoccupied CLS. As
a result CLS distanced itself from Marxism, ° and its (outdated)
formal determinism,"1 and, in the process, from a general critique.
Thus, it seems that CLS failed or refused to provide a coherent
radical vision of social change52 by refusing to reevaluate, and
psychotherapy. See infra note 50.
50 Kennedy himself, acknowledged that he is no "radical" in the sense he
gives the term in the Polemic. The radical is "the person who wants to go
further, right now, practically, to dismantle existing structures of hierarchy that
look evil, and wants to go further, right now, practically, in confronting or
subverting the forces that keep them in place." KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note
9, at 81. Kennedy reiterated his position for small-scale resistance in Sexy
Dressing, as well as the limits of his strategy. KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, supra
note 8, at 126. See also Let's Talk About Sex, Baby!, 107 HARv. L. REv. 745,
745-46 (1994) (book note of Kennedy's Sexy Dressing). He is not the only crit
distancing the movement from Marxism. It should be recognized that crits often
deny their Marxist heritage, frequently out of a fear of "mischaracterization":
While it is true that a number of CLS scholars have traced their
intellectual heritage to ideas associated with Marx and modem
continental philosophers, it is wrong to conclude that CLS can be
equated with vulgar marxism or sixties anarchism. Of course, the fact
that CLS is openly a 'leftist' academic movement is partly responsible
for generating a new 'politics of mischaracterization.
Minda, supra note 17, at 603 n.15.
"' Duncan Kennedy, A Symposium of Critical Legal Studies: The Role of
Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U.
L. REv. 939, 995-96 (1985) [hereinafter Critical Legal Studies]. See also
Kennedy, Gramsci and the Legal System, supra note 20. (applying Gramsci's
theory to legal studies and embracing with apparent relief a "Marxist" Gramsci
who rejected the "vulgar" dichotomy of base and superstructure).
52 See Oetken, supra note 8, at 1545 (questioning whether CLS provided a
coherent vision of social change). For different opinions, see, e.g., Peter Gabel,
The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1584 (1984) (emphasizing the role of CLS and
demonstrating that the indeterminacy thesis helps to delegitimize "the apparently
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then perhaps embrace, true Marxist legal discourse. This in no way
resembles the rigidly narrow and somewhat de-intellectualized
version of Marxism that Kennedy once trumpeted as the "uncon-
scious exercise of powers [that] can lead eventually to the discov-
ery of the powers."53
Kennedy distanced himself from Marxism by stating that while
he was "not saying that capitalists don't exist, or that they don't
oppress others, ... this is only one in the list of modes of
oppression, and no longer, if it ever was, the central one. 54 He
also replaced the Marxist principles of base and superstructure,
which he viewed as a simplistic unidirectional relation," with
post-modem ambiguity and eclecticism. 5 6 While this was definite-
ly a departure and perhaps a new theme in his repertoire, whether
it ever could have a lasting impact upon the previous goals of CLS
seems to have been answered in the negative by the political as
well as intellectual indolence that presently characterizes the
movement. So far, the only result is an obvious and lamentable
change in the direction of CLS, which is the regrettable subdividing
of its "political place" into turf now variously claimed by "fem-
crits," critical race theorists, postmodemists, cultural radicals, and
determinate character that rights-thinking acquires through reification"); Tushnet,
supra note 2, at 1518 n.16 (assessing that CLS, as a political place, offers a
"common opposition to a system of illegitimate hierarchy").
" Kennedy, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 51, at 972.
In other words, Marx in Capital provides a model of how people
actually exercise powers they don't know they have, of how that
unconscious exercise of powers can lead eventually to the discovery of
the powers, and of how the discovery of powers can make it obvious
that we should exercise them consciously to achieve the goals we have.
Kennedy, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 51, at 972.
54 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 86-87.
55 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 86-88.
56 KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 2, at 1-20.
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self-styled political economists,57 mirroring Kennedy's own
apparent identity crisis.
As a result of the splintering of the CLS movement, CLS has
lost its voice in the legal community and now lacks a unified core
position. In 1983 CLS was still challenging and questioning major
issues of law and society and their relations to each other.5 As
the new century begins, this questioning has become one that
examines social hierarchy and even the distribution of rights, but
" In 1991 Mark Tushnet described the state of CLS as follows:
At present ... the political location of critical legal studies [is]
occupied by certain feminists ("fem-crits"), certain theorists concerned
with the role of race in law (critical race theorists), a group influenced
by recent developments in literary theory (postmodemists), a group of
cultural radicals, and a group that stresses the role of the economic
structure in setting the conditions for legal decisions (political
economists).
Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1517-18 & nn.10-14. Critical race theory, for example
has been viewed as a response to CLS, which due to its desire to preserve the
rights discourse has been described as "more sympathetic to legal liberalism than
critical legal studies was." LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 177-78 (1996). See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW (3d ed. 1992) (addressing the issue of racial progress within the historic
context of African Americans' demands for liberation and equality); Regina
Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identifica-
tion, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769 (1992) (applying critical race theory in addressing
"the black community" as a socio-economic and political space). See also
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991)
(addressing the virtues and the limits of "identity politics").
5 As David M. Trubek noted, in the mid-1980s, CLS questioned its method
and its ability to discover the true nature of social relations. Trubek, supra note
27, at 575-76.
[P]eople within the CLS movement sometimes attack[ed] research that
focuse[d] on attitudes, behavior, and impact as a form of 'social
science mystification' that hides the true nature of social relations and
the real importance of law in society. Participants in this debate seem
to be arguing about method, and particularly about the value of
'empiricism' in legal studies.
Trubek, supra note 27, at 576.
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in a far more atomized, and less generalized way.59 Thus, while
there had always been many aspects of CLS, in the 1980s, CLS
had a core position, because its belief, as Joel F. Handler stated
was "that there is no such thing as objective, neutral legal
rules." 6 For CLS, legal rules were "socially constructed to reflect
prevailing interests of power and domination, and [] the mythology
of legal discourse serves to mystify and pacify the oppressed., 61
Of course, this claim yielded dissenters. Some of them rejected
CLS's methodology, preferring immediate though arguably modest
results in the legal order,62 while others went so far as to deny the
" The shift in emphasis is most dramatically obvious in the increasing
importance of so-called "identity politics" which, naturally, abandoned class
analysis for other sources of social dysfunction. See, e.g., Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997) (emphasizing the
need to address class analysis within gay and lesbian legal discourse); Naomi
Mezey, Book Note, Legal Radicals in Madonna's Closet: The Influence of
Identity Politics, Popular Culture, and a New Generation on Critical Legal
Studies, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1844 (1994) (doubting Kennedy's "wholeheart-
ed" embracing of identity politics while departing from class analysis in SEXY
DRESSING, supra note 8). Mezey suggests that Kennedy's efforts are doomed and
while he might try to adjust his beliefs, such changes would be unconvincing. Id.
Mezey implies that Kennedy does not understand his own dilemma and persists
in being "eclectic" and thus self destroying. Id. at 1846. See generally Frances
Elisabeth Olsen, Feminism in Central and Eastern Europe: Risks and Possibili-
ties of American Engagement, 106 YALE L.J. 2215 (1997) (implying that "class-
based" strategies are incompatible with "gender-based" strategies and that
because of what Olsen claims is the apparent failure of the former, the latter
becomes, in some way, the favored strategy).
60 Joel F. Handler, The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A Twenty Year
Perspective: "Constructing The Political Spectacle": Interpretation of Entitle-
ments, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 899, 959 (1990).
61 Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 216-35 (1986). See also Robert W. Gordon, Critical
Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 73-75 (1984); KELMAN, supra note 1, at
ch. 2.
62 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 36, at 690 ("The lack of coherent political
objectives in the CLS program induced many groups such as feminists and
critical race theorists to spin off with their own particularist programs for social
justice.").
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very notion of a legal order.63 Furthermore, while some dissenters
questioned the ability of the method employed by CLS to "produce
valid knowledge about law in society,"' others concentrated on
more concrete but regrettably atomized issues involving the effect
of CLS's "critique of rights" on various social groups identified by
gender or race, for example, which had the effect, of prioritizing
those issues over economic class.65 Still others adopted an eclectic
post-modernist attitude toward law and its social role.66 Thus,
legal scholars who identify themselves as minority or feminist
scholars criticized CLS for its failure to focus on the possibility
that various minorities might be empowered through civil rights
activism.67
63 According to Trubek, CLS has defined itself by its "critique of legal order
[by challenging] the idea that a legal order exists in any society." Trubek, supra
note 27, at 577.
' Trubek says that the "method Critical scholars employ stresses the study
of appellate cases and other indicia of legal doctrine, but overlooks 'empirical'
evidence of the social 'impact' of law or the behavior of legal actors." Trubek,
supra note 27, at 576.
65 To the extent that Marxism demands a focus on economic and class issues
(because of its conviction that social stratification into classes is determined by
economic differences), and to the extent that what CLS identifies as the
illegitimate power structure is based on class structure, any focus on what
therefore necessarily become collateral issues, such as the vindication of class-
derived and class-rooted rights undermines the unity of CLS as a Left movement.
As Peter Gabel noted, a focus on the vindication of rights, for example, means
to adopt "the very consciousness [feminist scholars] want to transform"). Gabel
& Kennedy, supra note 18, at 26.
66 KENNEDY, A CRrrIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 2, at 1-20 (Duncan
Kennedy himself seems to favor post-modem ambiguity and eclecticism).
67 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331, 1356 (1988) (discussing the subordination of African Americans in a
society that is formally dedicated to equality); Patricia Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 401, 431 (1987) (discussing the aspect of CLS that rejects rights-based
theory, particularly with respect to African Americans). See also Elizabeth
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 611-52 (1986) (discussing the dynamics of the interrelation-
ship of rights and politics); Comel West, CLS and a Liberal Critic, 97 YALE L.J.
757 (1988).
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As a result of this array of dissenting and conflicting interests,
CLS has been left with no cohesive voice, and it appears now as
a mere witness to the powerless atomization of an emasculated
radical Left discourse. This atomization may have promoted certain
group solidarities, and possibly offered short term relief. But,
despite CLS's influence on legal discourse, it never seemed able to
attain even a partially-unified leftist discourse. This failure might
be the cause of mutual estrangement among all of its "mem-
bers"--or at least a failure to offer a common core-that eventually
risks oblivion for the movement as a whole. In response, CLS now
must rediscover its voice in the legal community, even though the
old leftist habits and texts have far less luster and glitter than
fashionable literary theories.
II. THE RESUSCITATION OF CLS
The Polemic captured the essence of CLS. Divided into nine
parts and a "Utopian Proposal" for a legal curriculum, the Polemic
addressed "the role of legal education in American social life"68
by emphasizing its role in perpetuating legal hierarchy and
consequently, the total hierarchical social and class structure. 69 As
shown below, the six traits Kennedy identified as defining the
social hierarchy misrepresent the fact that far more people are
situated at the "bottom of the diamond," than at its top. By refusing
to acknowledge that the hierarchy is pyramid-shaped, instead of
diamond-shaped, Kennedy missed the fact that the bottom of the
social pyramid 7' has expanded. Thus, more than ever, an all-
embracing and honestly non-discriminating poverty has become the
true melting pot of whites and non-whites, aliens and citizens, men
and women, all together.71 Additionally, by ignoring the role of
68 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at i.
69 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 85.
70 As will be seen, a major part of this discussion concerns first, whether we
live in a social pyramid or, as Kennedy insists, a social diamond and, second,
what the implications of that societal structure might be.
71 Contrary to that evidence, Kennedy nevertheless stated that "[tihose at the
very bottom of the diamond of hierarchy are few in numbers, demoralized, and
functionally marginal to the totality." KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 86.
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the state as an important device in perpetuating the social hierar-
chy, Kennedy also missed the opportunity to expose the unique
features of the state as a tool of oppression. As shown by the
Polemic, CLS lost-or abandoned-the opportunity to elaborate the
Marxist concepts of base and superstructure, and because of that,
CLS may well have missed the opportunity to become a strong
leftist movement-instead of an almost cartoon-like caricature of
one-with an enduring legacy. It is time, and perhaps overdue, for
CLS to reconsider these issues.
A. Shortcomings of the Polemic
The Polemic, a short essay privately printed and addressed
mainly to American law students, purportedly invited its audience
to "[r]esist the ideological training for willing service in the
hierarchies of the corporate welfare state, ' 72 because that train-
ing-legal education-"contributes to the reproduction of illegiti-
mate hierarchy in the bar and in society' 73 As Robert Coles' book
review of the Polemic74 acknowledged, Kennedy explained the
need to "resist" in opposition to the obvious trend of young
initiates in the law to be willfully and gratefully "beaten into
submission... by a system meant to indoctrinate its enrollees with
the proper attitude toward contemporary corporate capitalism" in
order to enhance the respect they receive from others.75 Kennedy
suggests resisting as a means to change the system leftwardly, and
that is the core of the Polemic, at least in this author's reading of
it.76 The Polemic, a symbol of CLS at its radical peak,77 (but
72 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at i.
73 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at i.
74 Robert Coles, Hierarchy and Transcendence, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1487
(1984) (reviewing KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9).
71 Id. at 1491.
76 However, in A Critique of Adjudication, Kennedy circumscribes the act
of resisting the oppression to only those circumstances in which it is "worth
paying," meaning avoiding losing one's job, for example. Supra note 2, at 376.
77 I call this the radical peak of CLS for several reasons, all of which
explain why I feel the Polemic itself deserves the attention it is given in this
Article. First, it was around the time of the Polemic's publication that CLS seems
to have shifted from a determined class and economic analysis to, first, one of
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even then, as shown below, containing the germ of its eventual
decline), takes a "piecemeal ' 7 8 approach to social and political
change. First, Kennedy jettisoned the classic social pyramid that
has seemed to describe capitalism so aptly since well before Marx
and Engels.79 In an obvious battle with his Marxist instincts,80
Kennedy describes a diamond-shaped polity, with a blurred
proletariat and an unimportant state, claiming that there are more
people in the middle than at the extremes. 81 He explains this
social structure as one composed of cells that can and should be
changed only one by one, through "baby steps, ' 82 because when
all the cells are changed the system will have been changed more
or less automatically (I am tempted to say, magically).
The obvious problem with this view is that it reminds one more
of cancer than anything else. This modest approach is more or less
explained by Kennedy's disdain for grandiose theories, sulch as
Marx's, and his own belief-or, perhaps, despair-that the Left
cannot fashion a general solution that might encompass the wide
post-modem indeterminism and, second, to one of seeming psychological
personal fulfillment. Second, it is around the same time that Kennedy and Klare
published their bibliography of CLS literature which raised the national profile
of CLS but also seems to have ushered in the divisive individual and self-
centered tracts which, while riding the coattails of CLS, also robbed it of its
center. Kennedy & Klare, supra note 1, at 461.
78 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 91.
79 Alexander Hamilton in the 1700s, for example, was in favor of placing
"'men of property' . . . close to the top of the political and social pyramid."
GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT 91 (1970); THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 621 (H. Syrett
ed. 1962). For an interesting discourse on CLS scholars as anti-Hamiltonians, see
John Batt, American Legal Populism: A Jurisprudential and Historical Narrative,
Including Reflections on Critical Legal Studies, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 651 (1999).
go Apparently Kennedy is only a "disillusioned existentialist," who favors
"eclecticism." See Galloway, supra note 8, at 279 (stating that seemingly,
Kennedy accepts the label of "disillusioned existentialist"); KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 2, at 17 (providing an account of
judicial decision-making written from a "left wing and culturally modem-
ist/postmodemist" point of view).
81 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 11, at 85.
82 See supra note 49 (discussing the notion of "baby steps" as a method for
change).
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mass of people who, in his view, are irretrievably atomized.8 3 His
claim was this: "The left should not pretend that it has a solution,
especially a proposed institutional solution to the problem of how
substantive (not formal) equality of power and reward can exist in
a world where people are different from one another, irreducibly
and also valuably different., 84 Although the Polemic recognizes
the "endless attention [given] to trees at the expense of forests, 85
it is filled with the same stark, powerful, and jarring sense of
realism that Sartre observed in any number of Marx's works.86
Despite its "baby steps," and the divisions that appeared in CLS's
development within the decade following its publication, the
Polemic remains a point of reference in American leftist legal
thought.
Certainly, the Polemic deserves praise for its accurate "percep-
tion [of] hierarchy [as] both omnipresent and enormously impor-
tant," especially in light of its author's "position in the system of
class, sex, [religion,] and race (as an upper middle class white
male), and [his] rank in the professional hierarchy (as a Harvard
professor)., 87 Remarkably, however, while Kennedy understood
and described society's disproportionate distribution of power and
rights through the clear lens of Marxist tradition, his theoretical
model, as shown below, rejected that tradition. Within that
tradition, Kennedy clearly observed the unjust social hierarchy and
directly encouraged the legal community to oppose it.88 His
theoretical model discussed below, however, treats that hierarchy
gingerly and offers a remedy, which in Kennedy's own words is
"not at all revolutionary. "89 His "take" on social hierarchy follows
83 However, Duncan Kennedy has his own project for changing the world:
"My project for changing the world through artifact production is left wing and
culturally modemist/postmodemist." KENNEDY, A CRITQUE OF ADJUDICATION,
supra note 2, at 17.
84 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 92.
85 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at i.
86 See generally SARTRE, supra note 13, at 3-35 (explaining the perennial
topicality of Marxism).
87 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 11, at 75.
88 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 11, at 104.
89 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 11, at 104.
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from his disbelief in the extinction of capitalism.90 But, he favors
a transformation of the "system of hierarchy . . . done cell by cell,
until we reach the critical point at which the interconnectedness of
the system makes it possible to develop it as a whole toward a new
unity.'
Thus, his theory is at odds with his instincts and observations.
Kennedy's model of hierarchy has the following traits:
First, the structure is diamond shaped rather than dichoto-
mous or pyramidal, with more people in the middle than
at the top or the bottom.
Second, at a given level, regionalism and the division of
labor, along with race and sex, create sharp cleavages in
tastes, capacities, and values.
Third, the whole is organized into corporate cells, each of
which includes people from different strata doing different
tasks; to some extent people identify with 'their' corporate
cell rather than with their class position.
Fourth, each of the corporate cells roughly mirrors the
internal hierarchical arrangement of all the others, and of
the hierarchy viewed as a totality.
Fifth, every one of these internally hierarchical elements
supports by analogy the legitimacy of each of the others,
while at the same time contributing to the functioning of
the whole through what it produces.
Sixth, there are no 'primary' or 'fundamental' parts of this
structure, no part that is 'material' as opposed to 'super-
structural,' and every part is constituted by a complex
blending of the use of threat of force with ideological
cooptation.92
There are, of course, several problems with this analysis.
Among the six traits Kennedy embraces, the first and sixth are the
most immediately problematic. Viewing the social structure as a
diamond, instead of as a pyramid (the first trait), Kennedy avoided
90 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 11, at 104 ("This point of view is not at
all revolutionary: ... it is certainly not based on a theory that capitalism is
doomed by its own internal contradictions to succumb to the rising proletariat.").
91 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 11, at 98.
92 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 11, at 85.
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the reality that the many at the bottom of the pyramid (or even
those at and below the middle of the hypothetical diamond) have
fewer rights and entitlements than those at the top. By positing a
diamond-shaped society, Kennedy avoided recognition of any
meaningful social differences within the legal discourse of rights
and entitlements. He also rendered irrelevant the construction of a
coherent legal discourse about the socio-economic roots of law.
Simplistically put, if there is no significant jarringly obvious
bottom to the polity, there is no reason to question what role law
plays in keeping it there.
It is important to understand the stark significance of
Kennedy's rejection of the social pyramid in favor of a diamond.
First, in simple topographical terms it becomes clear both visually
and theoretically that a pyramidal society oppresses and exploits
the vast majority of its people. Second, and more dramatically, is
the visual and theoretical conclusion offered by a comparison
between the linear base and the literal point at the apex. Mathemat-
ically, the base of the pyramid is infinitely larger, and thus
infinitely more abused, than the apex. Both of these conclusions
disappear with the advent of a diamond. The lower part of the
diamond is no larger than the top, of course, but more importantly
the bottom is, like the apex, a point-a location with neither width
nor height. No one lives there! Kennedy has fashioned a descrip-
tion of capitalism in which it is possible to satisfy Rawls' demand
that the system be judged by how it treats "the least advantaged
members of society., 93 In the diamond, the least privileged do not
exist! This is, of course, an exaggeration and surely a distortion of
Kennedy's intent, but his diamond, after all, is surely an even
larger exaggeration and more serious distortion of how people
really live in America.
The sixth trait also shows a desire to avoid a discourse of
differences, at least of the classically Marxist economic kind. There
are most assuredly "fundamental" parts in our society, and, as
shown below, the state is not just one more "corporate cell" among
many. However, what is still more telling is the fact that although
the pamphlet version of the Polemic's theoretical model may have
93 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1971).
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"homogenized" the social structure beyond recognition, there is no
similar theoretical model of social hierarchy in the condensed
Chapter Edition of the same work.94 Because the Chapter Edition,
including its 1998 edition, does not address the above mentioned
traits, the discussion below is limited to the perceived inaccuracies
of the traits as they are explained in the Polemic.
B. Social Pauperization and the Social Pyramid
The pyramid has often described the traditional European feudal
society: A "hierarchical social and political structure with the
sovereign at the apex of this conceptual pyramid," who had no
"heavenly" checks circumscribing his power and was answerable
to no one.95 Ironically, despite Kennedy's insistence that the dia-
mond, not the pyramid, characterizes our situation, the latter may
more accurately describe present American society,96 where the
few individual and corporate interests at the very top have become
answerable to no one.97
94 Compare KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, with Kennedy, Legal
Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITCs OF LAW, supra note 12,
at 54.
9' Melanne Andromecca Civic, A Comparative Analysis of International and
Chinese Human Rights Law-Universality Versus Cultural Relativism, 2 BUFF.
J. INT'L L. 285, 294 (1996). See also STORZH, supra note 79, at 91 (explaining
Alexander Hamilton's idea of placing "men of property" at the top of the
political and social pyramid).
96 Frank Levy, Rhetoric and Reality: Making Sense of the Income Gap
Debate, HARvARD Bus. REv. (Sept.-Oct. 1999) at 169. ("The Federal Reserve
Board reports that in 1995 ... the richest 1% of households... owned about
a third of all net worth; the next richest 10% of households ... owned
approximately another third; and the remaining [89% of] households owned the
rest."); David Cay Johnston, Gap Between Rich and Poor Found Substantially
Wider, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at 16 (noting that the gap between the rich 1%
and the bottom 50% has increased).
9' For more contemporary accounts of pyramidal structures of social power
see, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and
the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDozo L. REv.
947, 965 (1999) (discussing the pyramid of power regarding legislative policy
making); Ronald Smothers, A Step to End Newark's Chapter in High-Rise Public
Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at B 1 (discussing the negative effect of any
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The present distribution of wealth and resources is such that a
larger and poorer base than ever forms the bottom of the social
pyramid. 98 The plight of various minorities has worsened. More
African-Americans in their twenties do not have jobs, and spend
time in jails. 99 In fact, one in seven adult black males has lost his
voting rights as a result of jail time."° As one commentator
notes:
The status of being a minority, poor or handicapped is
routine in America. 'Growth in real wages virtually halted
in 1973, and families today spend a higher proportion of
their incomes on housing, transportation, health care,
higher education, and taxes. Poverty rates among young
families have almost doubled since the 1960s.' And the
composition of these poor families has changed too:
Today, one in four children in the United States is raised
by just one parent, usually a divorced or unmarried mother.
Many grow up without the consistent presence of a father
in their lives. One of every five children lives in a family
tax cuts which, in the opinion of Andrew Cuomo, the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, "again would give most of the surplus to those on the top
1 percent of the income ladder"). See also Stanley A. Gacek, Revisiting the
Corporatist and Contractualist Models of Labor Law Regimes: A Review of the
Brazilian and American Systems, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 21, 47 (1994) (discussing
the coherent pyramidal structure at the labor union level). Kennedy freely speaks
about the pyramid-like structure of liberal and conservative ideologies, but again,
he focuses on the "middle term." KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION,
supra note 2, at 48 ("The crucial part of the pyramid is the middle term.").
9s See infra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the rising number
of impoverished Americans). See also Nina Bernstein, Poverty Rate Persists in
City Despite Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999, at BI (stating that, "despite the
strongest economy in years, nearly one out of every four [New York City]
residents had income below, the Federal Government's poverty threshold last
year"); Robert Pear, Gore Pledges a Health Plan for Every Child, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 8, 1999, at Al (acknowledging that the number of Americans without
health coverage has increased steadily in the 1990s and today exceeds 43
million).
" Rodger Doyle, Behind Bars in the U.S. and Europe, SCI. AM., Aug. 1999,
at 25 (citing Marc Bauer, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, WASHINGTON, D.C. (1997);
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics for 1998).
10 Id.
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without a minimally decent income. Many of these families
are desperately poor, with incomes less than half the
federal poverty level. Each year, half a million babies are
born to teenage girls ill prepared to assume the responsibil-
ities of parenthood. Most of these mothers are unmarried,
many have not completed their education, and few have
prospects for an economically secure future. 1 '
Even a large part of the middle class of the burgeoning 1980s
have lost that social status: most of them have aged out of their
privileges. They (or their parents) live now on Medicaid/Medicare
benefits in housing for the aged, clearly impoverished, with aging
widows and widowers living worse than intact couples.10 2 Their
children-high school and even college graduates-also are often
101 Rev. Raymond C. O'Brien, An Argument for the Inclusion of Children
Without Medicare, 33 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 567, 575-76 (1995)
(citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 65, Dep't
Commerce (1990). "Between 1959 and 1969, the poverty rate in the United
States declined dramatically. By 1971 it had increased slightly, and -then it
decreased again during 1972-73, to a point when, at 11.1 percent, it was the
lowest poverty rate in a 24-year period. After 1978, the poverty rate rose
steadily, and in 1992, the rate was 14.5 percent, or 36.8 million persons." Id.
(citation omitted). See also Guy Gugliotta, Number of Poor Americans Rises for
3rd Year; 36.9 Million Live in Poverty and 37.4 Million Lack Health Insurance,
Census Bureau Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1993, at A6.
102 As has been reported:
With long-term care costs reaching toward $100,000 a year in most
metropolitan areas, thousands of older people have faced poverty in
paying for the care of a loved one. Others have deliberately and legally
impoverished themselves by transferring or giving away modest estates
to qualify for Medicaid nursing care, a program designed for the poor
now being used increasingly by middle-income, working-class
Americans because it's the only long-term care program the nation
offers.
Saul Friedman, Gray Matters/Long-Tern Care Demons, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb.
26, 2000, at B8.
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unable to get a job perpetuating those privileges.10 3 Their experi-
ence is closer to the following description:
For most of our history, American parents have delighted
in seeing their children achieve more than they did
themselves. Overall, each generation has been better
educated, better housed, more skilled, and more economi-
cally secure than the previous one. But for many Ameri-
cans, those days are over. . Middle-income families
report greater difficulty making ends meet. For perhaps the
first time since the Great Depression, American children
will no longer routinely surpass their parents' standard of
living.' °4
At the top of the pyramid or diamond, of course, economic,
political, and social status remain unchanged-perhaps because
major corporate interests are never threatened. As Kennedy has
noted, "[t]he presidential campaigns that epitomize American
politics are determined by how skillfully rival candidates within the
political center spend millions of dollars 'marketing' themselves,
like soap powders, through intellectually empty advertising and
vacuous campaign speeches designed to play a few seconds on the
local television news."10 5
103 Rachel Astrachan, Benefit to Aid Kin of Cabbie, BUFFALO NEWS, July 14,
1997, at B 1 (describing the plight of a college graduate who could not find work
in his field and became a taxi driver to support his family); Nancy Cleeland, Hey
Dude, What Economic Boom? Poll: Young Minorities, Non-college Grads Have
Most Negative Job Outlook, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 5, 1999, at F9 (addressing
the low-paid, no-benefits jobs available to young, minority non-college
graduates); Peter T. Kilbom, Low-Wage Businesses Add to Number of Uninsured
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1999, at A20 (addressing the fact that under-
educated workers can obtain only low-paid and no-benefits jobs).
"o4 Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-first
Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993, 1998 n.22 (1993) (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON
CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES 8 (1991)).
105 Duncan Kennedy, Radical Intellectuals in American Culture and Politics,
or My Talk at the Gramsci Institute, in 2 RETHINKING MARXISM (1988), repub-
lished in KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, supra note 8, at 3. See also Presidential
Bidding, NATION, Aug. 23, 1999, at 3 ("In the first six months of this year, the
presidential candidates took in about $103 million, three times the amount raised
at the same point four years ago."); The Costliest Race in the World, ECONO-
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Finally, it is interesting to note that even Kennedy deleted the
diamond-shaped structure from his Chapter Edition. His more
recent efforts, such as A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative
Action in Legal Academia,1°6 for example, address single facets
of social pauperization, abstracted from any larger theoretical
system, such as minorities' status and their lack of rights and pow-
ers. 10 7 Still, such a focus could have been the first step in a
Marxist retrospective, had it not been coupled with Kennedy's
suggestion that minorities' disenfranchisement be cured through
promotion based on race as a "unique scholarly credential"'' 8
instead of through, for instance, intensive investments in truly non-
discriminatory public education leading to a color-blind meritocra-
cy. Radically revamping public education costs money, of course,
while treating race alone as merit has no immediate economic
effect. But why not, after all, choose a non-economic cure when
the diamond denies that class and economics are the cause? While
it is true that social mobility depends upon access to knowledge,
Kennedy's suggestion is obviously unworkable," especially in
light of the former Eastern Bloc's experience; the only thing that
system achieved by artificially creating intelligentsia out of people
based on their social identity rather than their merit was its own
destruction.1 0
MIST, July 31, 1999 at 23-24 (noting that "[n]o presidential candidate has ever
raised as much as George W. Bush by this stage").
'o' 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (reprinted in KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, supra note
8, at 34-82) (questioning the social definition of merit and whether merit can be
divorced from culture).
'0' KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, supra note 8, at 34-35, 42-43, 54-55.
'0 KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, supra note 8, at 44.
109 Kennedy's solution certainly contests Randall Kennedy's definition of
"merit"-achievement based on some standard indifferent to the individual's
social identity. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1745, 1772 n.114 (1989).
10 Take Ceausescu, the late Romanian dictator, for example, whose final
reward as president of a country which promoted or manipulated him into high
office based solely on his credentials as that of a cobbler's apprentice, was death
by a firing squad.
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C. Within the Structure/Super-structure Division, the State Is
Not a Mere Corporate Cell
While the pamphlet edition of the Polemic stated that there
were no "primary" parts of the social structure of power, and while
it may be true that "the use of threat of force with ideological
cooptation""' is felt in all social strata, the Chapter Edition
11 2
does not address the erroneous or the viable elements of this trait.
Nothing related to the power structure is present in the Chapter
Edition, which is the only version still in print and thus available
in the post-1990s era. It seems as if CLS's attempt to "demystify
the symbolic authority of the State" as exemplified through the
trappings of the law1 3 has succeeded in ways unintended. While
it is true, as Kennedy pointed out in 1983, that many features and
functions of the state as a variety of public corporation have been
transferred to private corporations,1 and that, for instance,
people may commit less crime, not necessarily because they fear
police brutality" 5 but because of the social pressure to avoid
trouble in order to keep their corporate jobs, the state certainly, and
despite Kennedy's claims to the contrary, still remains an important
and unique tool that holds the social pyramid together. 6 Both
m KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 85.
112 Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, supra note 12, at
54.
13 See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images:
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 369, 376 (1983) (urging lawyers in dealing with the legal system to
"develop a relation of genuine equality ... with [the] client" and to reshape the
way the law represents conflicts, bringing out "the true socioeconomic and
political foundations of legal disputes"); Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 18, at 40
("Rights analysis is a way of imagining the world... . One way to give it order
and coherence is to imagine that it is a drama in which there is a state, and then
the rights bearers, and stuff like that.").
1'4 KENNEDY, POLEMIC, supra note 9, at 87.
11 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 354 (1997) (stressing the idea that fear of criminal
punishment is not as much a deterrent as expected).
116 See Levy, supra note 96, at 164 (discussing government involvement in
the market from the Carter to the Clinton administration).
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domestically and internationally, the United States government
continues to act (or refrains from acting) to maintain the social
hierarchy. Thus, the state's use of authority to maintain and
organize the current social structure of power, class, and wealth
ought to be addressed by today's CLS adherents, in order to
preserve their left political place.117
1. The State as a Promoter of the Corporate Interest Abroad
As only one, but a crucial example of the unique and irreplace-
able role played by the state, it has successfully promoted the
interests of American corporations abroadl l' under the rubric of
global well-being, and of creating, legitimating, and enforcing a tax
structure that cannot and does not benefit anyone but the rich119
17 Addressing the role played by the state has been and continues to be a
defining line between left and right. See e.g., GILLES LIPOVETSKY, L'ERE DU
VIDE, 141-151 (1983) (addressing the role of the state from his and Daniel Bell's
perspective).
118 The Clinton Administration succeeded in securing Congressional
implementation of two controversial agreements, the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GAIT') Uruguay Round Agreements. North American Free Trade Implementa-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993); Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). In fact "both the Clinton
and Bush administrations have been supportive of both the GATT and the
NAFTA and have gone to great lengths to avoid conflicts between the terms of
these agreements and their policies." Robert F. Housman, Democratizing
International Trade Decision-making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 740 (1994).
19 For example:
The Reagan-Bush White House cut taxes for the wealthy, theorizing
that the wealthy would invest their money so that the benefits would
'trickle down' to the middle class and the poor. Federal funds available
for domestic problem solving were reduced significantly. While the
wealthiest Americans prospered, most families did not benefit from the
decade's growth. The richest 1% of the population received 60% of the
economic growth. Their average pre-tax family income swelled from
$315,000 in 1977 to $560,000 in 1989. By the end of the decade,
according to the Wall Street Journal, the 2.5 million Americans at the
top of the income scale were taking in as much each year as the 100
million people at the bottom.
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and the corporate interest. 120 The state may well have been joined
by the corporation at the apex of the pyramid but, despite Ken-
nedy's argument, it clearly remains an indispensable partner in the
social penthouse it shares with corporate America.
United States government and state officials, in their singular
roles, advanced corporate interests abroad both worldwide, through
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), 12  and
regionally, through the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") 1 22 And it was only in that singular role as the state
Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 1351, 1363 (1993). See also Charles 0. Galvin Tax Policy-Past, Present,
and Future, 49 SMU L. REV. 83, 88 (1995) (explaining that taxes are to protect
the public interest in a democratic society); A Favor-the-Rich Tax Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1997, at A24 (describing the proposed tax bill of Bill Archer
from the House Committee on Taxation, which supported cuts in capital gains
and inheritance taxes, as "showering the rich with benefits").
120 As Senator Russell Feingold has said:
Americans are becoming disenfranchised from their own democratic
process; they see lobbyists, lawmakers, policy experts and pundits
creating a cozy circle of influence for themselves that few, if any,
ordinary citizens can hope to enter. That's why you saw legislation like
a $50 billion tax break for corporate tobacco interests anonymously
inserted into revenue legislation in July 1997, or $331 million added
to 1998's Defense Department appropriations bill for B-2 bombers that
may not work and that the Pentagon certainly doesn't want. That's why
you see a whole galaxy of federal subsidies rewarding some of the
wealthiest interests in our nation survive despite the continued presence
of a deficit and despite repeated efforts to trim them or kill them.
Senator Russell Feingold, The Supreme Issue: Wisconsin's Leadership in
Government Reform, 1998 WIs. L. REV. 823, 825-26.
121 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194.
122 Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). "Economic integration under the
NAFTA will touch trade in services, international investment, rights of
establishment, and issues of environmental, labor, immigration, travel, intellectual
property, and even competition law." Spencer Weber Waller, The International-
ization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 360 (1997). See also
Edwin S. Flores Troy, The Development of Modern Frameworks for Patent
Protection: Mexico, a Model for Reform, TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 133, 134
(1998) ("As a net exporter of ideas, it was not surprising that the United States
and Canada would require their trading partners within the agreement to
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that it was accomplished. For example, the Clinton administration
managed the current expansion of free-trade ideologies, which
ensured the protection of some of the most profitable of our
commercial sectors-medicine, 23  movies,1 24  and soft-
ware-through the internationalization of United States patent,
trademark and copyright laws-laws which, until recently, had been
universally recognized as purely internal, domestic regimes.1 25
Beginning with the "Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round,
Punta del Este," in the 1990s,126 the United States government
played a crucial role in globalizing the enforcement of so-called
recognize and enforce the intellectual property rights of all their citizens and
corporations.").
123 Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing
Countries: U.S. Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LoY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 569, 582-83, 594 n.184 (1994).
124 Sandrine Cahn, Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception: Does it Exist
in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does it Affect or Is it Affected by the
Agreement on TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 281-82 & n.7
(1997) ("U.S. films today represent eighty percent of the films distributed in
European movie theaters, and over fifty-five percent of the films shown on
European television networks. The U.S. audiovisual industry is the country's
second largest export industry, following the aerospace industry.") See also ELIo
DI Rupo, OUVERTURE DES TRAVAUX, IN L'EUROPE ET LES ENJEUX DU GATT,
DOMAINE DE L'AUDIOviSUEL 21 (1994); FRANKLIN DEHOUSSE & FRANCOISE
HAVELANGE, L'EUROPE ET LES ENJEUX DU GATI, DOMAINE DE L'AUDIOvISUEL
99 (1994).
125 See Carlos A. Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property
Rights and the GAIT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243
(1989) (noting "the United States [through GATIT] is trying to translate its
domestic provisions into international standards"). This article points out that
recent developments demonstrate that the United States is "exporting" extrater-
ritorially intellectual property law that traditionally was always thought to be a
domestic, or intraterritorial matter. Id.
126 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Punta del Este, reprinted
in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 19, 25 (33d Supp. 1986).
For an accessible summary of that declaration and the politics behind it see, e.g.,
Philip H. Trezise, The Uruguay Round High Hopes, Hard Realities, and
Unfinished Business, Regulation, Vol. 14, No. 1, (1991) (visited Apr. 30, 2000)
<http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/articles/regl4nla.html> ("Each new GAT
negotiation was convened at American initiative. Few of the contracting parties
were prepared to send home the negotiators from the world's largest economy
with no progress to report to an unpredictable U.S. Congress.").
447
448 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
intellectual property rights securing international monopolies in the
above mentioned and other American products7-a goal that
had long occupied the international "free-trade" negotiating
agenda 28 of GATT129 and of those at the apex of the interna-
l27 Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy,
59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1636-37 (1998) (stating that, "NAFTA and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
which arose out of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under [] GATT,
were the first international agreements to deal with trade secrets"). TRIPS, part
of the revisions to GATT, imposed stricter copyright, patent and trademark laws
internationally, the effect of which, by definition, is to expand intellectual
property claims across national borders that has previously prohibited all or many
of these monopolies. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International
Property, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
'28 The Clinton Administration's Trade Representative, Ambassador Mickey
Kantor, stated:
One of my principal responsibilities as USTR is to open foreign
markets and break down barriers to U.S. manufactured goods,
agricultural products, and services. This includes pursuing the strong
protection of U.S. intellectual property, so important to our high
technology industries. When all is said and done, opening foreign
markets is our main objective in the Uruguay Round; it is the impetus,
from our standpoint, for the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA); it will be a principal focus of our efforts with respect to
Japan and China, as well as in other nations around the world ...
Consequently, we need to use every tool at our disposal-multilaterally
where possible, and bilaterally where necessary-to make sure that
other markets are comparably open to our own.
Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in
an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 468-469
(1994) (citing testimony of Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative,
before the Senate Committee on Finance, Mar. 9, 1993).
9 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). GATT and the TRIPS
Agreement were ratified as part of the Uruguay Round on December 13, 1995.
19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (Supp. 11995). See also Results of the Uruguay Round
Negotiations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-7 (1994) (statement of Ambassador Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade
Representative (regarding the merits of the "largest, broadest trade agreement in
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tional social pyramid. This clearly disfavored those less developed
nations dramatically in proportion to their proximity to the bottom
of the global pyramid. 130 At the same time it denied their citizens
access and perhaps even rights to such basics as health care and
information generally, including that most basic of international
raw materials, education.13 1 It would be interesting to speculate
on how convincing Kennedy's thesis would be if it were global-
ized-that is, that the global population resembles more a diamond
than a pyramid. Thus, under the guise of international "free trade,"
American corporate interests have thrived at the top, while labor,
history"). See also GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1991); U.S.
Framework Proposal to GATT Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1371 (Nov. 4, 1987); State Department Program Examines
"GATT and Intellectual Property," 31 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 497 (Apr. 10, 1986).
130 Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary
Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 443, 472-73 (1997)
(addressing the TRIPS agreement's adverse effects "on poor and rural popula-
tions," particularly in the southern hemisphere by "radically limiting policy
options previously available to governments"). TRIPS mandates privatization of
"much of what has been understood since the nineteenth century as pub-
lic-utilities, education, libraries, information, hospitals, and roads." Id. at 473.
131 Commentators criticized in vain the connection between "free trade" and
intellectual property as facilitating international protection of information as
private property rather than as a public good. TRIPS, for example, obliges every
state, including those from the Third World, to implement patent and copyright
laws and to provide infrastructure to support such regulatory schemes, and
protects public goods as pieces of private property, thus privatizing "much of
what has been understood since the nineteenth century as public-utilities,
education, libraries, information, hospitals, and roads." Orford, supra note 130,
at 472.
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the bottom of the social pyramid, suffers domestically1 3 ' and
internationally. 13
2. The State as a Promoter of the Domestic Corporate Interest
Domestically, the state also operates as a protector of the
corporate interest. Through a regressive tax structure, 34 the state
132 NAFrA, for example, caused the loss of many jobs of working class
Americans.
A study by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), NAFTA's Casualties:
Employment Effects on Men, Women, and Minorities, attempts to get
a more precise gauge of NAFTA on particular communities of
workers. In addition to the data collected on women and workers of
color, EPI estimated a much larger number of job losses than the
official reports issued by the Clinton administration. The model created
by EPI looked at the net job impact of NAFTA rather than simply just
the number of NAFTA-created jobs that the administration used.
Employing this methodology, EPI determined that 'NAFTA resulted in
a net job loss of 394,835 jobs in the period 1993-1997.' This number
accounts for the difference between the 385,834 domestic jobs lost by
NAFTA-related imports from Mexico and the 158,171 created by
exports to Mexico; and the 411,481 jobs lost by NAFTA-related
imports from Canada and the 244,309 created by exports to Canada.
In total, domestic jobs lost as a result of NAFTA totaled 797,315. This
figure was offset by only 402,480 new jobs.
Clarence Lusane, Persisting Disparities: Globalization and the Economic Status
of African Americans, 42 How. L.J. 431, 444-45 (1999).
133 See Orford, supra note 130, at 472. (noting that TRIPS and GATT have
been criticized for the effects they are likely to have on poor and rural
populations); CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE
URUGUAY RoUND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990) (explaining the developing
countries' needs for weak intellectual property protection in order to protect a
supply of essential goods, especially in education and medicine, despite the
Western industrialized countries' portrayals of this as criminal "piracy" and
"counterfeiting").
'34 The tax structure in the United States is progressive in name only. Morris
Berstein, Social Security Reform and the Growth of Inequality, 8 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 57, 63 (1999) (stating that "among the chief causes of the growth
in inequality ... [is] an increasingly regressive tax system"); Marc Linder,
Eisenhower-Era Marxist-Confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of Rate
Reduction for the Rich, 70 TUL. L. REv. 905, 907 (1996) ("Successive
Congresses since the first Reagan administration have so thoroughly subverted
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threatens equality of opportunity. Basic elements of social justice,
such as public schools and health care, are further jeopardized135
by threats to cut education funds and an already limited Medicare
system of national health care.136 Kennedy's elimination of the
state as a, or possibly the, major element in the social pyramid (or
diamond) ignores the strategy of privatization and self-abnegation
by which the lower portions of the pyramid are barred from access
to fundamental human needs such as health care. It is surely
significant that the state, through the Clinton administration,
the legitimacy of high and progressive income taxes for the rich that an advocate
runs the risk of facing the same derision that the economist and comptroller-
general of the ancien regime, Turgot, icily reserved for the draft of such a tax
more than two centuries ago: 'II faut executer 1'auteur, et non le projet'."); Alan
Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place in the
Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207, 269 (1987) ("For many years, the
federal tax system relied on steeply progressive individual income tax rates to
implement our concept of vertical equity. However, since the early 1960s,
Congress has cut the top individual tax rate from ninety-one percent to twenty-
eight percent."); William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare
System, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1431, 1461 (1986) ("As the Social Security payroll tax
grew from a negligible portion of federal revenues in 1939 to more than one
quarter of them in 1977, the tax system became less progressive. This distribu-
tional tendency has been compounded by the income tax exemption for Social
Security benefits-a regressive tax expenditure estimated for 1977 at $5.1
billion."). Of course, other basic elements, such as decent housing, are threatened
by tax cuts. See Smothers, supra note 97, at B 1 (discussing the negative effect
of any tax cuts which, in Andrew Cuomo's opinion, "again would force
exclusion of the poor [and] would give most of the surplus to those on the top
1 percent of the income ladder").
135 Dan W. Brock & Norman Daniels, Ethical Foundations of the Clinton
Administration's Proposed New Health Care System, 271 J. AM. MED. Ass'N
1189, 1191 (1994); The Great Tax Giveaway, NATION, Aug. 23, 1999 (discussing
the Republicans' pledge to use most of the trillions of dollars in surpluses "for
a massive tax cut that is morally offensive, dishonest, corrupt and reckless,"
instead of addressing "long unmet needs-shor[ing] up Social Security,
extend[ing] and protect[ing] Medicare, insur[ing] that every child gets a healthy
start, [and] invest[ing] in the schools and teachers vital for the next generation").
36 While the number of people without health insurance has been rising in
the last decade and now exceeds 43 million, the current Republican proposal in
the Senate vows a $792 billion tax-cut. Eric Schmitt, Lott Says Veto Is Likely to
Kill Tax Cut in '99, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at Al; Pear, supra note 98, at
Al.
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promoted the private sector, while de-emphasizing the role of the
state, in the provision of health care. 137 When the effort to
provide a national health insurance system failed, the state
essentially was admitting that health care is a private, not a public,
good-that is, that private insurance was the only solution-which
seemingly legitimized the failure to obtain any kind of national
health plan. It is surely not the same to claim that the state is
unimportant as it is to observe that the state itself claims that it is
unimportant. While many health care theorists compare health care
to other basic state responsibilities, such as primary and secondary
education, and view them "as fundamentally important in securing
equality of opportunity," the state is nevertheless engaged in
disavowing its responsibilities for both health and public educa-
tion. 138
137 John D. Blum, Universality, Quality & Economics: Finding a Balance in
Ontario and British Columbia, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 203, 225-228 (1994)
(addressing the differences between universal health care systems subsidized by
the state for all residents, such as the Canadian system, and the "Clinton reform,"
which tried "to finance care in the context of the current [health insurance]
system"); David T. Morris, Cost Containment and Reproductive Autonomy:
Prenatal Genetic Screening and the American Health Security Act of 1993, 20
AM. J. L. & MED. 295, 298 (1994) ("On October 27, 1993, President Clinton
formally introduced to Congress his administration's plan to provide the nation
with universal health insurance coverage. If enacted into law, the Health Security
Act [H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)] promise[d] to restructure the
delivery of health care in the United States.").
138 Laura E. Cunningham, National Health Insurance and the Medical
Deduction, 50 TAx L. REv. 237, 257-58 (1995). In Florida, one commentator
acknowledged that "our crabbed tax system has prevented investment," for
example, in "the education and health care of pre-school children, [although] this
is the area where our need is so great." Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, The 1997-
98 Constitution Revision Commission: Reflections and Commentary from the
Commission's First Chairman, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 19, 23 (1997). In New
York, Timothy G. Kremer, the executive director of the New York State School
Boards Association, believes that "it would be shortsighted to stint on preparing
children to compete in a 21st century economy just to save a few nickels now
on the local tax rate," and that a voucher system would not be "smart social
policy when the money would come from struggling public schools that will still
have to educate the vast majority of students. Those schools already face
financial challenges trying to supply basics like books or heated classrooms."
Timothy G. Kremer, School Districts Didn't Steal Tax Cut, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan.
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Thus, while Kennedy's diamond asserts the contrary, 139 the
state remains the singular and irreplaceable device by which the
hierarchy is secured, maintaining the social pyramid through a host
of domestic and international strategies, including legal rules.
Surely this merits study, not denial.
CONCLUSION
Within certain limits, CLS has delivered a coherent legal
discourse about social injustice and the role played by the legal
community. Its limits are famously identified in Kennedy's work,
especially in the various editions of the infamous little red book.
But, it seems tragic and lamentable to note that CLS's self-imposed
limits also caused its intellectual death-an irony that evokes the
many lives and deaths of Kenny, the cartoon character who does
not always understand what happens to him or why he is dead
(again). CLS has now reached a point of crisis, however, at which
it cannot function. It cannot attack liberal theories, as it is one of
them, and it forgot how to challenge conservative ones. Thus, for
CLS there is only one route out of oblivion: to become a truly
leftist movement and achieve resurrection with a purpose.
1, 2000, at 3C (internal quotation marks omitted).
13' For a crit critique of the Marxist theory of the state see Kennedy, Critical
Legal Studies, supra note 51, at 993.
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